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ABSTRACT 
Studies have indicated that climate change is likely to have dramatic negative effects for Caribbean small 
island developing states (SIDS).  This article considers some of the main economic effects that climate 
change is anticipated to have in these vulnerable states, charts the progress of international negotiations at 
the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and provides a brief analysis of the impact of the Copenhagen Accord 
to Caribbean SIDS. 
Although climate change has traditionally been seen solely as an environmental issue, its economic 
effects on vulnerable developing nations, such as Caribbean SIDS, force a redefinition of climate change 
to suggest a more complex union of environmental and developmental issues for these states.  By 
highlighting some of the anticipated economic effects of climate change for Caribbean SIDS, the author 
aims to place this issue into a broader context.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Climate change poses difficult issues in the 
international arena.  It is a long-term problem 
which requires coordinated and long-term policy 
solutions from sovereign states.  It is a global 
problem affecting a global common good, created, 
in large part, by a number of industrialised 
nations.  Moreover, the effects of climate change 
will be felt mostly by developing countries 
including small island developing states (SIDS), 
which must rely on the largely voluntary future 
mitigation commitments of certain industrialised 
countries (Haites, Pantin, Attza, Bruce, & 
MacKinnon, 2002, p. 2).  These commitments are 
currently being negotiated through the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) process, which produced a 
poor result for Caribbean states in the 
Copenhagen Accord developed during the 15th 
Conference of the Parties in Denmark in 
December 2009. 
This article considers some of the main economic 
effects that climate change is anticipated to have 
in these vulnerable states, charts the progress of 
international negotiations at the 2009 Copenhagen 
conference, and provides a brief analysis of the 
impact of the Copenhagen Accord to Caribbean 
small island states. 
This commentary on the anticipated economic 
effects of climate change on Caribbean SIDS 
draws largely from three major reports: Haites et 
al. (2002), Assessment of the Economic Impact of 
Climate Change on CARICOM Countries, Bueno, 
Herzfeld, Stanton & Ackerman (2008), The 
Caribbean and Climate Change: The Costs of 
Inaction and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report (2008).   
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A Complex Issue 
Climate change involves both material and, 
arguably, moral dimensions (Hovi, Sprinz & 
Underdal, 2009, p. 28), and is anticipated to have 
detrimental environmental, social and economic 
effects for vulnerable developing nations, many of 
which have not contributed significantly to global 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Climate change, 
however, is an extremely difficult issue to resolve 
internationally.  As Tol (2009) describes it, 
"Climate change is the mother of all externalities: 
larger, more complex, and more uncertain than 
any other environmental problem" (p. 29).  Nation 
states, marked by territorial sovereignty, many by 
term-limited governments and market-driven 
economies, are largely ill-equipped to deal 
effectively with the problem of climate change 
(Hovi et al., 2009, p. 29). 
Moreover, as efforts to tackle climate change are 
designed to protect a collective good, some states 
(particularly those that may be locked into fossil 
fuel intensive economies who can afford to adapt 
to the effects of climate change) may be reluctant 
to cut their emissions unless their economic 
competitors do the same.  This leaves vulnerable 
states, like those in the Caribbean, in an 
unenviable position: poised to bear the brunt of 
the effects of climate change, and largely 
powerless to mitigate its effects. 
Characteristic Vulnerabilities of Caribbean 
SIDS 
There is no universal definition of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS); however, there are 
currently 51 SIDS included in the list used by the 
United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs.  They are categorized by their 
three regions: AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, 
Mediterranean and South China Sea), the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (United Nations 
Environment Programme [UNEP], 2008, p. 3).  
Caribbean countries are located between latitudes 
11° and 18° north, from The Bahamas in the north 
to Suriname in the south, and, with a few 
exceptions, consist primarily of island states (p. 
6).  The Bahamas has been included as it is a 
member of CARICOM.  The Caribbean non-
island states are Belize in Central America and 
Guyana and Suriname in South America. 
Caribbean states are diverse in their governance 
systems, income, size, topography and political 
affiliations (UNEP, 2009, p.15).  A United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
study found the total population in the Caribbean 
to be approximately 30.3 million, with an overall 
urban population of 18 million at mid-year 2007 
(p. 7).  In 2006, the GDP per capita in the 
Caribbean averaged US$10,194 (p. 6).  In most of 
these countries there is a general trend towards 
declining agriculture production and rising service 
sectors, with tourism providing an average of 35% 
of GDP (UNEP, 2009, p. 11).  Levels of poverty 
have been measured at approximately 38% of the 
total population according to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC, 2006, p. 5), with levels 
ranging from between, for example, 9 % in The 
Bahamas to 75% in Haiti (p. 4).  The study 
estimated that approximately 6.7 million people in 
the Caribbean are undernourished (p. 16).2 
The Caribbean claims high levels of biological 
diversity, with high levels of endemism and high 
extinction rates due to unsustainable natural 
resource exploitation, poorly managed tourism, 
pollution, habitat destruction, natural events and 
the introduction of alien species (UNEP, 2009, p. 
2).  According to USAID, a select group of 
Caribbean countries scored a total environmental 
performance index of 72.9, with biodiversity and 
habitat scoring lowest at 46.7 (2007, p. 34).3 
Caribbean small island states share a set of 
common characteristics which make them 
uniquely vulnerable to the anticipated effects of 
climate change.  One set of common 
                                                          
2 Poverty was defined as a lack of economic 
resources or an absence of living conditions 
considered basic by the society.  Levels of 
extreme poverty were not available for this study 
and statistical data was scarce for the statistics on 
undernourishment (UN ECLAC, 2009, p. 7 and p. 
16) 
3 USAID provided an environmental index for a 
select group of Caribbean countries measuring 
the broad environmental protection objectives of 
reducing environmental stresses on human 
health, and promoting ecosystem vitality and 
sound natural resource management.  The study 
scored countries on a scale of 0-100, with higher 
scores being better. 
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characteristics are geographic vulnerabilities, 
which include: 
• low-lying areas vulnerable to sea level rise 
and storm surges; 
• geographic positions strongly affected by 
tropical storms and hurricanes; 
• current high temperatures (e.g., with mean 
annual values of 20 °C and above; Haites et 
al., 2002, p. 5);  
• scarce land resources; and 
• considerable dependence on fresh 
groundwater resources. 
These geographic characteristics are compounded 
by socio-economic vulnerabilities, including: 
• concentrations of population and 
infrastructure along coastal regions.  It is 
estimated that approximately 70% of the 
Caribbean population lives in coastal cities, 
towns and villages (UNEP, 2008, p. 7); 
• dependence on a narrow range of export 
products; 
• susceptibility to international trade and 
commodity prices; 
• small domestic markets and limited ability to 
develop economies of scale; 
• limited opportunities for economic 
diversification; 
• high transportation and communication costs; 
and 
• weak institutional structures and limited 
human capacity (UNEP, 2008, p. 3). 
Combined, these characteristics make Caribbean 
SIDS uniquely vulnerable to the environmental 
impacts of climate change, and their attendant 
social and economic effects. 
Economic Effects of Climate Change 
Greenhouse gases are defined as gaseous 
constituents that absorb and re-emit infrared 
radiation (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 1.5) and 
commonly include carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride.  Once 
emitted, these gases remain in the atmosphere for 
long periods of time.  The IPCC’s Climate 
Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2008) stated that 
both past and future anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
will continue to contribute to global warming and 
sea level rise for more than a millennium due to 
the time scales required for the removal of this gas 
from the atmosphere (p. 47)4.  As such, climate 
change will continue for some time because of 
past emissions, even if greenhouse gas emissions 
were to be stabilized today. 
A major international study on the economic 
effects of climate change was prepared by Stern 
(2006) for the British Government.  Stern states 
that “Climate change is a result of the externality 
associated with greenhouse-gas emissions – it 
entails costs that are not paid for by those who 
create the emissions” (p. 23).  As a result, it can 
be seen as market failure of the greatest scale, and 
entails four interconnected complexities: 
• it is a global externality in cause and 
consequence; 
• its impacts are persistent and develop 
over time; 
• the uncertainties surrounding climate 
change are considerable both about its 
potential, size, type and timing of its 
impacts, and the costs of combating it; 
and 
• its impacts are likely to have significant 
effects on the global economy (p. 25). 
In addition, Stern states that the effects of climate 
change will not be felt evenly across the globe, 
allowing some countries to benefit from modest 
increases in temperature, and others to suffer.  At 
greater temperature increases, most countries will 
suffer heavily as global growth is adversely 
affected (2006, p. 55).  All developmental 
aspirations of states could be affected by climate 
change (p. 114).  Coupled with population 
growth, climate change could lead to slower 
growth leading to increasing levels of poverty, 
which may in turn exacerbate competition for 
                                                          
4 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) established the IPCC in 1988.  
Membership is open to member states of the 
WMO and UNEP.  The IPCC represents a unique 
partnership between the scientific community and 
governments.  Its role is to provide policy-relevant 
but not policy-prescriptive information on key 
aspects of climate change, including the physical 
basis, and impacts of and vulnerability to climate 
change in human and natural systems. 
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resources, and potentially lead to dislocation, 
migration and even conflict (p. 108-112). 
Stern estimated the total cost of business as usual 
climate change over the next two centuries will 
equate to an average welfare loss equivalent to at 
least 5% of the value of the global per capita 
consumption now and forever (2006, p. 144).  If 
impacts on health and the environment, including 
the disproportionate burden on poor regions of the 
world, are taken into account, the costs could 
accumulate to around 20% (p. 144).  It is 
important to note that the economic modelling 
used in the Review to quantify the potential 
economic effects of climate change are for 
illustrative purposes only, and contain large 
values of uncertainties.  However, in all the 
scenarios used, the consequence of climate change 
is anticipated to become disproportionately more 
severe with increased warming (p. 158).  Stern 
also calculated that the costs of action to reduce 
greenhouse gases enough to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change, could be limited to as 
little as 1% of global GDP (2006, p. 572).  
Tol (2009) provides an analysis of previous 
studies of the anticipated global economic impacts 
of climate change and various models used over 
the years (p. 30-33).  As with the Stern Review, 
Tol’s comparison of previous studies shows that 
some regions will be negatively affected by 
climate change, and some may benefit from 
modest increases in temperatures, although the 
analysis suggests that the turning point in terms of 
economic benefits occurs at 1.1 °C (p. 34).  The 
study leads to two policy conclusions.  First that 
any stringent abatement of greenhouse gases from 
industrialised countries involves in part a 
consideration of the plight of citizens of low-
income countries and the effects imposed on them 
by citizens of high-income countries and second, 
“if pre-existing poverty is one of the main causes 
for vulnerability to climate change, one may 
wonder whether stimulating economic growth or 
emission abatement is the better way to reduce the 
effects of climate change” (p. 36). 
Both Tol and Stern point to the vast levels of 
uncertainties involved in estimating the economic 
effects of climate change.  Both also point out that 
negative surprises are more likely than positive 
ones (Tol, 2009, p. 37; Stern, 2006, p. 291), 
thereby providing impetus to global efforts to 
address the issue. 
Economic Effects of Climate Change on 
Small Island States 
There is a limited amount of research on the 
economic effects of climate change on small 
island states in the Caribbean.  Both Haites et al. 
(2002) and Bueno et al. (2008) state that they 
were hampered by the lack of availability of 
comprehensive data in the Caribbean.  
The Haites et al. study estimated that the largest 
category of impacts in the Caribbean due to 
climate change would be the loss of land, tourism 
infrastructure, housing and other infrastructure 
due to sea level rise (an estimated 65-75% of the 
total losses; 2002, p. 44).  The remaining losses 
would be due to reduced tourism demand because 
of increased temperatures, loss of beaches, coral 
reefs and other ecosystems (15-20% of the losses), 
as well as property damage as a result of increased 
intensity of hurricanes and tropical storms (7-11% 
of the losses; Haites et al., 2002, p. 44).  The 
report estimated a potential economic range of 
impact of US$1.4 to $9 billion on the 2000 
economy.  The report itself advocated treating its 
results with some caution, for several reasons.  
The wide range of estimates resulted from limited 
data and numerous assumptions that had to be 
made about the economic impact of climate 
change (not due to uncertainty about the 
occurrence of climate change), and therefore the 
figures should be treated as very rough estimates 
(Haites et al., 2002, p. iii).  The report based 
economic impacts on the then current (2000) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures, even 
though climate change may continue to occur for 
over 50 to 80 years, and future Caribbean GDPs 
may be less sensitive to climate change.  The 
estimated economic effects did not include 
adaptation measures which may reduce the 
potential economic impact of climate change.  In 
addition, the report did not include some 
anticipated categories of economic loss, such as 
loss of agricultural and fisheries output, as the 
values could not be calculated with existing data.  
Finally, it is important to note that the report was 
based on the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC 
published in 2001, however, it provides a useful 
starting point to target areas for adaptation to 
climate change in the Caribbean. 
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Bueno et al. (2008) based their report on the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (summarized in 
its Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 
2008).  This report significantly increased the 
estimated economic damage in the Caribbean.  
The report compared two scenarios: one high 
impact scenario, based on business as usual with 
global emissions going unchecked throughout the 
21st century, and a low impact scenario based on 
rapid global stabilization of greenhouse gas 
emissions leading to greatly reduced emissions by 
2050.  The difference between the two scenarios 
was calculated as the costs to the Caribbean of 
global inaction on climate change.  These costs 
were estimated at US$22 billion annually by 2050 
and US$46 billion annually by 2100 for the 
Caribbean region; representing 10% and 22% of 
the Caribbean’s GDP based on 2004 GDP results 
(Bueno et al., 2008, p. 2).  The results vary by 
region; for example, in The Bahamas, the 
estimated costs are 6.6% of GDP by 2025, rising 
to 31.7% of GDP by 2100 (p. 4).  These estimates 
may be conservative, as they were based on only 
three categories of losses: hurricane damage, 
tourism losses and infrastructure damage from sea 
level rise exclusive of hurricane damage.  Due to 
lack of access to data, these estimates did not take 
into account the effects of climate change on areas 
such as agriculture, public health, water resources, 
energy and other ecosystem losses (p. 2).  
Already, these potential losses are staggering 
costs for small, fragile economies to bear.  As 
these costs may not be avoidable, it may mean 
that already limited resources will have to be 
diverted from other pressing developmental needs 
such as education and poverty reduction.  The 
report makes sober reading, stating,  
As damages mount up, climate change will 
cause a breakdown in Caribbean economic life; 
at some point – likely well before the projected 
annual damages reach 100% of GDP – it will 
become impossible to keep restoring damaged 
property, and tourism and other weather-
sensitive industries will move elsewhere.  
Indeed, as sea levels rise, residents of small, 
low-lying islands like Turks and Caicos, may be 
unable to continue inhabiting them (pp. 14-15). 
Sectoral Impacts 
The IPCC Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (2008) states with very high confidence (a 
term used by the IPCC to assess uncertainty 
quantitatively meaning a confidence scale of 9 out 
of 10) that the global average net effect of human 
activities since 1750 has been one of warming (p. 
37).  The IPCC (2008) found that during the 
period 1995-2006, eleven of those twelve years 
were recorded as the twelve warmest years in 
global surface temperatures since 1850 (p. 30).  
Future anticipated warming is estimated by the 
report based on a number of emission scenarios 
reported in the IPCC’s Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) published in 2000.  
Most notably, the A1F1 fossil fuel intensive (or 
business-as-usual) scenario anticipates an increase 
of 4 °C by the end of the century (based on an 
estimated range of 2.4-6.4 °C rise; IPCC, 2008, p. 
45). 
Continued climate change is anticipated to be 
largely inevitable considering past global 
emissions and the long-lived effect of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, and will have a variety of 
sectoral impacts in the Caribbean.  Its effect on 
the economy and ecosystems of the Caribbean 
will be particularly devastating for poor 
communities in the region, who often rely on 
environmental products and services for 
subsistence products, income, food security and 
health (Stern, 2006, p. 95).  
The Impact of Temperature Increases on 
Tourism and Health in the Caribbean 
Haites et al. reported that average annual 
temperatures in the Caribbean have already risen 
by at least 0.5 °C over the period  1900-1995, and 
in some Caribbean countries by 1 °C (2002, p. 5).  
They also estimated future temperature increases 
in the Caribbean from 1.5-1.9 °C by 2050, and 
from 2-3.3°C by 2080 in the warmest months of 
June through August (2002, p. 7). However, these 
estimates may be conservative as the report was 
based on the data published in Climate Change 
2001, also known as the Third Assessment Report 
of the IPCC. 
As global temperatures increase, tourists may 
choose not to travel to tropical destinations, 
content with warmer local temperatures, and 
Caribbean temperatures may become too hot for 
them.  Research by Lise and Tol conducted on 
climate change and tourist demand in Europe 
found that climate is a very important factor in a 
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tourist’s choice of destination, with the ideal 
temperature being 21 °C (as cited in Haites et al., 
2002, p. 26).  With the mean average temperature 
of the northernmost Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) country, The Bahamas, already at 23 
°C in January and 28 °C in July (Haites et al., 
2002, p. 26), the Caribbean may already be too 
hot for the majority of European tourists. 
Increased temperatures will also allow for an 
increase in vector-borne diseases, such as malaria 
and dengue fever, and also acute respiratory 
infections and heat stress (Haites et al., 2002, p. 
39 and UNEP, 2008, p. 19). Increased instances of 
diseases will put increased strain on already 
overburdened public health institutions in the 
region. 
Sea Level Rise, Infrastructural and Ecosystem 
Loss 
The rise in global temperatures causes sea levels 
to rise because of thermal expansion of water in 
its natural state, and the melting of glaciers, polar 
ice caps and polar ice sheets (IPCC, 2008, p. 30).  
Thermal expansion is estimated to contribute 
approximately 57% of sea level rise, with ice cap 
and glacier melt contributing about 28% and polar 
ice sheet melt the remainder.  The oceans absorb 
over 80% of the heat being added to the climate 
system, and take longer to warm than land (p. 30).  
As a result, it is anticipated that sea levels will 
continue to rise long after (and if) greenhouse gas 
emissions are stabilized. 
The IPCC (2008) stated that global sea levels rose 
at an average rate of 1.8 mm per year from 1961 
to 2003, with a much greater average rise from 
1993 to 2003 of 3.1 mm per year (p. 30).  Using 
the same emissions scenario of A1F1, the IPCC 
anticipates that sea levels will rise between 0.26-
0.59 m by the end of the century (p. 45).  This 
estimate is conservative as it excludes 
uncertainties in climate carbon-cycle feedbacks, 
and the full effects of future changes in ice sheet 
flow (p. 45).5  Sea level rise rates will vary across 
the Caribbean region as various factors may affect 
                                                          
5 These results were not included because a 
basis in published literature for them was lacking. 
As a result, the upper values for sea level rise 
given in the IPCC Report are not considered 
upper bounds for sea level rise, and the rise is 
expected to be higher than anticipated.  
it, such as the rate of warming, the efficiency of 
ocean circulation and local atmospheric effects 
and currents (Haites et al., 2002, p. 6). 
Sea level rise would have catastrophic effects on 
most Caribbean SIDS, and may even render some 
islands uninhabitable.  For those Caribbean 
islands that do remain habitable, sea level rise will 
likely necessitate expensive relocation and 
rebuilding exercises, as their infrastructure is 
mainly located in vulnerable coastal areas.  Haites 
et al. (2002) estimate an annualized replacement 
cost for buildings and infrastructure on land lost 
to sea level rise at approximately US$960 million 
to US$6.1 billion (p. 32).  This will cause 
immense disruption to economic, social and 
cultural ways of life in the Caribbean.  
Increased sea levels will also lead to coastal 
erosion and loss of coral reefs, mangroves and 
other wetland areas.  The annual value of beach 
areas lost due to sea level rise is estimated at 
between US$550 million to US$2.4 billion in the 
Caribbean due to loss of tourism alone (Haites et 
al., 2002, p. 29).  Burke and Maidens (2004) 
estimated the annual net economic value of coral 
reefs in the Caribbean to be between US$3.1 
billion and US$4.6 billion as a result of their 
ecosystem services which provide tourism 
revenue, high fishery yields, and shoreline 
protection (p. 14).  By 2015 the annual losses due 
to degradation of coral reefs in the Caribbean are 
estimated at between US$100-300 million to the 
tourism industry (p. 14), although the losses may 
be disproportionate in one area as tourists move to 
healthier reef systems.  
Stern states that globally, people will feel the 
impact of climate change most strongly through 
changes in the distribution of water around the 
world (2006, p. 62). Countries such as Antigua 
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, and 
Grenada, will suffer further from sea level rise as 
they are heavily reliant on groundwater resources 
and are already deemed to be water-stressed 
countries (Haites et al., 2002, p. 34).  Salt water 
intrusion into freshwater lenses as a result of sea 
level rise, combined with over-extraction from 
these lenses and reduced precipitation, would 
devastate these important sources of freshwater.  
The cost to these four water-stressed countries 
was estimated by the Haites et al. report as 
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adaptation costs because the value of existing 
freshwater sources where water was scarce was 
not available.  The adaptation costs were 
estimated by calculating the cost differential of 
producing desalinated water against using surface 
and groundwater supplies, on the assumption that 
freshwater supplies will decline by 8% in these 
countries.  The costs were estimated at US$4.9 to 
US$8.4 million for these four countries (Haites et 
al., 2002, pp. 34-35). 
Reilly et al. (2007) come to some varying 
conclusions when comparing, in different 
scenarios, the combined impact of changes in 
climate, increases of CO2, and changes in ozone on 
crops, pasture and forest land productivity.  This 
is a unique study as it looks at the effects of both 
CO2 and ozone emissions. Changes in climate and 
CO2 effects alone were found to be beneficial 
globally in terms of increased yields, however, 
when combined with ozone damage, many areas 
experienced severely negative effects, especially 
cropland areas in the Northern Hemisphere (p. 
11). The study acknowledges that the net 
economic effects of changes in agriculture, 
pasture and forestry are a complex combination of 
changing patterns of trade and other resource 
reallocations (p. 16). 
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility (2010) estimates that the overall impacts 
to the agricultural sector in the Caribbean due to 
climate change will vary dramatically between its 
countries.  Changes in yields will be induced by 
climate zone shifts, leading to, for example, an 
estimated negative shift of 45% in yields for sugar 
cane in Belize, but a positive 10% shift in yields 
for bananas in Belize based on net production 
volumes of 2030 compared to 2009 (p. 21).  
Rising Water Temperatures and Ocean 
Acidification 
The rise in sea temperature is anticipated to have 
many detrimental effects on marine and 
freshwater biological systems, including coral 
reefs (IPCC, 2008, p. 33).  Coral reefs are very 
sensitive to temperature changes, tolerating only 
slight increases.  They react to elevated water 
temperatures by paling in colour or bleaching 
(Haites et al., 2002, p. 12).  Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 
(2007) looked at the combined impact of rapid 
climate change and ocean acidification on coral 
reefs, and indicates that temperatures of 1 °C to 2 
°C over the summer maxima for 3 to 4 weeks can 
lead to coral bleaching (p. 1740). There have 
already been many coral bleaching events in the 
Caribbean followed by high levels of coral 
mortality (UNEP, 2008, p. 8).  Recent studies also 
suggest that 80% of living coral reefs in the 
Caribbean have been lost in the past twenty years 
(p. 7).  Human stressors such as anchoring on 
reefs, dynamiting and applying chemicals for 
fishing, combined with unabated climate change, 
could lead to widespread coral mortality 
throughout the Caribbean (IPCC, 2008, p. 65). 
Coral reefs represent important resources for the 
Caribbean, providing protective barriers for 
beaches and coasts, and nurseries for fish and 
crustaceans.  They also provide the setting for a 
significant amount of biodiversity in the 
Caribbean.  However, “the open-access nature and 
public good characteristics of these resources 
often results in their being undervalued in 
decision making regarding their use and 
conservation” (Brander, Rehdanz, Tol, & van 
Beukering, 2009, p. 4).  Brander et al.’s results 
concerning valuation of coral reefs state that, all 
else being equal, Caribbean reefs have higher 
values than reefs in any other region studied 
(2009, p. 6).  The loss of these reefs will have a 
detrimental effect on tourism and fishing 
industries in the Caribbean, presenting a loss in 
GDP for seafood exporting nations, as well as a 
loss of a critical source of dietary protein for 
subsistence fishermen and poor communities 
(UNEP, 2008, p. 12).6 
As the oceans absorb more carbon from the 
atmosphere, it is anticipated that the oceans will 
become more acidic.  The Brander et al. study 
indicates that under different IPCC SRES 
scenarios, estimated global loss of coral reefs due 
only to projected ocean acidification by the 2100s 
varies from 16% (but falling) in the B1 scenario, 
to 27% (but rising) in the A2 scenario (2009, p.7).  
The study by Hoegh-Gulburg et al. indicates that 
combined acidification and bleaching enhances 
the trajectory of coral reefs towards domination 
by macroalgae and non-coral communities (2009, 
                                                          
6 In the Caribbean, fish is the most important 
source of protein after poultry (UNEP, 2009, p. 
60). 
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p. 1740). Whilst the effects of ocean acidification 
are not entirely certain (impact and economic 
studies are rare), it is anticipated that ocean 
acidification will impact the future growth of 
coral reefs and the ability of crustaceans to form 
shells; a further blow to the tourism and fishing 
industries and welfare of the Caribbean.   
Increased Hurricane Intensity and Storm 
Surges 
The IPCC stated that it is likely that future 
tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes), will 
become more intense, with larger peak wind 
speeds and heavier precipitation (2008, p. 46).  
There are few global historical records of tropical 
cyclones, and this fact, combined with large 
fluctuations in the frequency and intensity of 
tropical cyclones, makes any predictions 
regarding increased frequency and/or intensity of 
tropical cyclones difficult (Knutson et al., 2010, p. 
157).  Knutson et al. state that on the basis of 
projected 21st century global warming, there will 
be some increase in the mean maximum wind 
speed of tropical cyclones (e.g., storm intensity) 
of approximately 2-11% globally, with increased 
rainfall rates, but with potential decreases in the 
overall frequency of tropical cyclones (2010, p. 
158-161).  Increased intensity of tropical cyclones 
would lead to increased storm surges and flooding 
events, causing infrastructural damage, loss of 
life, increased injuries, an increased spread of 
vector-borne diseases, and a reduced tourist 
demand. 
These individual sectoral impacts may become 
even more damaging when combined in a climate 
feedback loop.  For example, the absence of coral 
reefs acting as natural barriers, combined with 
increased sea levels, increased intensity of 
hurricanes, and increased storm surges may have 
an exponentially negative effect on Caribbean 
states.  Stern states that climate change itself may 
be a powerful feedback loop which could 
accelerate future warming (2006, p. 10). 
It is clear that the cumulative effects of climate 
change are likely to have negative implications for 
the livelihoods of populations in the Caribbean 
(UNEP, 2008, p. 25), making climate change an 
urgent problem for the people of the Caribbean.  
However, recent international negotiations aimed 
at tackling the issue of climate change have failed 
to provide adequate measures to fully mitigate the 
anticipated effects of climate change for 
Caribbean SIDS. 
The Copenhagen Conference 
The Copenhagen Accord was the result of the 
Copenhagen Conference held December 7-19, 
2009.  The Conference represented the 15th 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC since 
the Convention came into effect in 1994.   
The UNFCCC is a framework convention that 
includes general obligations for its parties, but 
does not include specific, binding emissions 
targets.  As of December 2009, the UNFCCC had 
192 parties (including the United States).  The 
first major protocol agreed under the UNFCCC 
was the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force in 
2005, and by the end of 2009 had 190 parties, 
with the United States being the only developed 
country that failed to ratify the Protocol.  The 
Kyoto Protocol includes binding emissions targets 
for developed country parties.  These are listed in 
Annex I of the Protocol, and developed countries 
which are subject to these targets are called Annex 
I Parties.  Developing country parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol have no binding emissions targets, and 
are therefore referred to as non-Annex I Parties.  
International climate change negotiations under 
the UNFCCC to date have continued along two 
negotiating tracks: one under the UNFCCC called 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action, and one under the Kyoto 
Protocol called the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties.   
The emissions targets for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012.  At the 
13th Conference of the Parties in Bali, Indonesia, 
which took place in 2007, parties to the UNFCCC 
agreed that a second commitment period was 
necessary for developed countries to reduce their 
emissions, and that a program of adaptation for 
developing countries was also needed.  This 2007 
agreement, called the Bali Roadmap, stated that 
developing countries would agree to nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions, which would, 
however, not be binding.  The Bali Roadmap 
anticipated that these issues would be agreed as 
part of a binding legal agreement during the 
Copenhagen Conference in 2009.  
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Disappointingly, for various reasons, this did not 
occur. 
The North-South Negotiating Divide7 
There has been a growing divide between 
industrialised (north) and developing (south) 
countries over the form and content of 
international climate change obligations. 
Many developing countries have seen the issue as 
one of obligations owed from industrialised 
countries for the damage that their emissions have 
caused and will cause to these developing 
countries, and of an equitable sharing of 
development space in the future (Dubash, 2009, p. 
8).  Many vulnerable developing countries 
expected that climate change negotiations would 
centre on the principle of international equity, 
encapsulated in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC 
(1992) which states: 
The Parties should protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities [emphasis added].  
Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof. 
As a result, many developing countries hoped for 
a legally binding agreement from the Annex I 
Parties of the Kyoto Protocol and the United 
States, containing dramatic cuts in emissions from 
industrialised countries.  In particular, the 
Alliance of Small and Island States, the 
negotiating bloc for SIDS, expected that pledged 
emissions cuts would keep the level of 
temperature rise to 1.5 °C compared to pre-
industrial levels, using the slogan “1.5 to stay 
alive”.  This would have meant that carbon 
concentrations in the atmosphere would have to 
be stabilised at roughly 350 ppm, necessitating a 
reduction of existing atmospheric carbon 
concentration.  In 2009 carbon concentrations 
were already roughly 387 ppm (Vidal, 2009).  
                                                          
7 The negotiating blocs and positions of 
industrialised and developing countries are 
complex and vary by issue.  This article provides 
a very general overview of positions. 
On the whole, following the Bali Roadmap, most 
developing countries were not expecting to 
commit to mitigation actions, nor were they 
expecting their mitigation actions to be subjected 
to international monitoring, reporting and 
verification.  In particular, developing countries 
wanted to retain a hard divide between the two 
negotiating tracks under the UNFCCC (where 
developing countries were not expected to agree 
to emissions cuts but were expected to agree to 
non-binding nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions) and under the Kyoto Protocol (where 
developed countries were expected to agree to 
new and binding emissions cuts).  Following the 
Bali Roadmap, many developing countries wanted 
new and additional financial assistance from 
industrialised countries to help them adapt to 
climate change.  It was anticipated by developing 
countries receiving assistance that they would 
have control over the disbursement of these funds.  
This assistance was not anticipated to be 
structured in the form of a loan, but rather as 
compensation for an ecological debt owed to 
developing countries that would not be 
conditional upon mitigation efforts. 
Many industrialised countries, on the other hand, 
argued that they owed no historic ecological debt 
to developing countries.  It was the United States 
lead climate negotiator Todd Stern “…who said ‘I 
actually completely reject the notion of a debt or 
reparations or anything of the like’ (Roberts, 
2009)” (Brown, 2010, Section 2, para. 24).  
Adaptation financing was framed by the United 
States as charity or largesse (Section 2, para. 24), 
thus effectively withdrawing any obligation to 
pay.  Although the European Union tried to 
convince industrialised countries to agree to deep 
emissions cuts, these largely fell on deaf ears 
(Guérin & Wemaere, 2009, p. 6).  The United 
States’s emissions position never changed in 
Copenhagen, largely because no United States 
domestic legislation on climate change had yet 
been passed (p. 6). 
Industrialised countries, in particular the United 
States, expected binding emissions cuts from 
emerging developing nations like China and India.  
Their argument was based, in part at least, on the 
fact that developing countries will account for 
over three quarters of the increase in emissions up 
to 2030 (Stern, 2006, p. 176).  Developed 
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countries also expected that the mitigation efforts 
of these developing nations would be subject to 
international monitoring, reporting and 
verification.  In fact, instead of a debate focusing 
on the urgent need to cut emissions for the benefit 
of vulnerable nations such as SIDS, much of the 
critical negotiations which led to the Accord 
centred on the relationship between the United 
States and China.   
With negotiations at a standstill, a limited number 
of heads of states took the unprecedented and 
contentious step of drafting the Copenhagen 
Accord, which was only noted by the full 
Conference of the Parties. 
The Copenhagen Accord 
At least 25 countries were asked by the 
Conference of the Parties President to participate 
in a high-level meeting in which the Copenhagen 
Accord was hammered out.  However, at the full 
Conference of the Parties session, the Accord was 
not adopted, as there was no unanimous 
agreement for the Parties to do so.  At least four 
countries objected, including the small island state 
of Tuvalu, and so the Accord was noted, and not 
adopted, by the Conference of the Parties. 
The Accord appears to represent a political 
bargain between the United States and the BASIC 
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries.  
It is arguable that the outcome of the United 
Nations process in Copenhagen favoured the big 
and emerging economic powers.  As a result, the 
Copenhagen Accord proved to be a great 
disappointment for Caribbean SIDS for several 
reasons: 
• the Accord is not a legally binding 
agreement, and does not anticipate a legally 
binding agreement being concluded in the 
next Conference of the Parties in Mexico in 
2010 or at any time in the future.  This means 
that emissions cuts provided by the parties 
under the Accord are not mandatory and 
cannot be enforced; 
• the Accord agrees to reduce global emissions 
to hold the increase in global temperature 
below 2 °C, and not the 1.5 °C that most 
SIDS consider necessary to prevent 
dangerous climate change; 
• the Accord does not agree to an atmospheric 
carbon concentration limit, which many 
believe is necessary to make any temperature 
limit meaningful; 
• the Accord does not include a baseline year 
for emissions targets, allowing some nations, 
like the United States and Canada, to make 
their baseline 2005 instead of the almost 
universally agreed baseline of 1990 under the 
Kyoto Protocol;  
• the Accord does not limit parties to any peak 
year for their emissions (the rate of emissions 
cuts required to meet a stabilisation goal is 
very sensitive to both the timing of the peak 
of global emissions and the height of that 
peak; Stern, 2006, p.199); 
• the Accord does agree to reassess its 
implementation, in particular, limiting 
temperature rise to 1.5 °C, but not until 2015, 
a date that many scientists consider too late 
to stop a 2 °C rise or greater; and 
• the Accord takes a bottom up approach, 
allowing each individual country to make its 
own emissions pledges. 
There lies within the Accord both cause for 
limited optimism and great concern.  Hope may 
exist for SIDS in the promise of a commitment of 
financial resources from developed countries, 
“approaching USD 30 billion” (UNFCCC, 2010, 
Article 8) for 2010-2012, prioritized for the most 
vulnerable nations, including SIDS, with a goal of 
mobilizing US$100 billion dollars a year by 2020 
(Article 8).  However, no financial institution or 
governance mechanism has been agreed for these 
funds, although the Copenhagen Green Climate 
Fund has been proposed to administer a 
significant portion of the funding, with a 
governance mechanism that equally represents 
both developed and developing countries (Article 
8). 
The major cause for concern for SIDS in the 
Accord is the 2 °C temperature goal.  There is a 
real danger that the 2 °C agreement in the Accord 
will remain unchanged in the next Conference of 
the Parties in Mexico at the end of 2010.  Carlos 
Fuller, Deputy Director of the Caribbean Centre 
for Climate Change, stated that the work of 16th 
Conference of the Parties in Mexico “… could be 
limited to merely translating the Copenhagen 
language into a new international agreement” 
(2010, p. 5). 
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The UNEP (2008) report stated that: 
For SIDS, the goal of stabilizing 
temperatures at 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels fails to consider the survival of island 
states, and means the loss of many critical 
ecosystems, including coral reef and 
fisheries, the flood of coastal communities, 
stronger storms, reduced water supply, 
increased droughts and desertification, and 
threats to food security (p. 75). 
However, a new report estimates that the 
emissions pledges that the industrialized and 
seven non-Annex I Parties have already 
committed to under the Accord are not sufficient 
to meet even the 2 °C temperature goal (Den 
Elzen, et al., 2010, p. 49). 
Stern reports that little can be done to change the 
predicted impacts of the existing stocks of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases on developing 
countries in the next few decades, and some 
adaptation will therefore be essential (2006, p. 
92).  Stern also contends that there are strong 
complementarities between development policy 
and adaptation actions in highly vulnerable states 
(2006, p. 305). 
Despite disappointing international efforts on 
mitigation, SIDS do have access to funding and 
are able to carry out adaptation projects both in 
the immediate future, and over the next few 
decades.  Many of the studies discussed in this 
article do not incorporate the potential that 
adaptation has to significantly decrease the costs 
of climate change to the Caribbean.  While co-
ordinated global mitigation efforts rely to a large 
extent on international co-operation, adaptation 
efforts do not.  Adaptation efforts can be based on 
international financing, bilateral, or even regional 
co-operation, and can deliver direct, local benefits 
to the region.   
Regional adaptation measures could include 
improved environmental management policies and 
practices, such as comprehensive land and coastal 
development policies and practices, sustainable 
fishery yields and strategically placed marine 
protected areas.  Combined these could help 
strengthen the resilience of fisheries, coral reefs 
and coastal zones.  Such efforts should be 
combined with public education and outreach 
strategies to raise awareness of the value of 
natural ecosystems.   
CONCLUSION 
Although climate change poses difficult issues 
internationally, the unique characteristics of 
Caribbean SIDS make them especially vulnerable 
to a changing climate.  The anticipated economic 
costs of climate change for small, fragile 
Caribbean economies, combined with significant 
ecosystem impacts, propels the issue of climate 
change for Caribbean SIDS from an 
environmental issue to a critical environmental 
and developmental issue. 
The unique vulnerability of Caribbean states to 
the effects of climate change stands in stark relief 
to their responsibility for the same.  The Haites et 
al. study estimated that CARICOM countries are 
responsible for only 0.16% of global CO2 
emissions (2002, p. 2). However, climate change 
will have a disproportionate effect on vulnerable 
Caribbean states, and an even greater effect on the 
poor of those states. 
Strong and early mitigation is the only way to 
avoid some of the more severe impacts that could 
occur in the second half of this century (Stern, 
2006, p. 91).  Considering the vulnerable position 
of Caribbean SIDS, and the dubious results for 
SIDS that the last international round of 
negotiations produced in the Copenhagen Accord, 
it would appear incumbent upon SIDS to continue 
to demand a renegotiation of the 2 °C temperature 
goal.  It is critical for SIDS that industrialized 
countries and large developing countries agree to 
further reduce their own emissions.  The difficulty 
for SIDS in this regard is that they have nothing to 
offer industrialised countries “no cash to offer and 
minimal emissions to reduce” (Huq, Chandani, & 
Anderson, 2009, p. 1). 
The way forward for Caribbean SIDS is 
challenging, and will involve complex policy 
choices.  Well managed domestic growth and 
development can help to equip SIDS to better 
manage climate change, not just as an 
environmental issue, but as a developmental issue 
as well.  Given the potentially heavy costs of 
climate change for the region, mitigation and 
adaptation strategies must form part of integrated 
national developmental and budgetary plans, 
preferably spearheaded by a central ministry such 
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as the Ministry of Finance to ensure priority and 
implementation.  
Future negotiations at the 16th UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties in Cancun, Mexico from 
November 29-December 10, 2010 and the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (or Rio +20) in 2012, 
will become key platforms for Caribbean SIDS to 
raise awareness of the developmental impact of 
climate change on their states.  
Postscript 
After this article was written, a report by the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(PBL, 2010) was published.  The PBL report 
consisted of a review of the IPCC Working Group 
II’s regional chapter and summary conclusions.  
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report consists of 
four volumes published with the umbrella title 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis, contribution of Working Group I; Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability, contribution of 
Working Group II; Mitigation of Climate Change, 
contribution of Working Group III; and a 
Synthesis Report which integrates the main 
outcomes of the three Working Group reports.  As 
the IPCC Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
(2008) was a major component of this overview, a 
postscript describing the outcome of the PBL 
report became necessary. 
The aim of the PBL report was to conduct an 
investigation of the extent to which the IPCC in 
its summaries had presented existing scientific 
knowledge to the world of policymakers in a way 
that was supported by the underlying texts and 
scientific references (PBL, 2010, p. 5).  The PBL 
report was initiated because of two reported errors 
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.  The first 
error concerned an erroneously high rate of 
melting of the Himalayan glaciers, and the second 
error concerned an erroneously high percentage of 
land area in the Netherlands lying below sea level.  
Both errors were contained in the regional 
chapters of the IPCC Working Group II report.  
The PBL report investigated both the regional 
chapters of the IPCC Working Group II report and 
the Synthesis report. 
The PBL report found that overall the summary 
conclusions of the IPCC were considered well-
founded and none were found to contain any 
significant errors (PBL, 2010, p. 9).  The PBL 
report further concluded that, in some instances, 
foundations for the summary statements should 
have been made more transparent (p. 9).  The PBL 
report resulted in a list of errata and corrections to 
the Working Group II’s contribution to the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report, which can be found on 
the IPCC’s website.  As of June 26, 2010, none of 
the listed errata affect the citations made in this 
article from the Synthesis Report. 
The PBL report further critiques the methodology 
of the IPCC in the Fourth Assessment Report.  
The IPCC methodology (which was agreed by its 
member governments) was to single out the most 
important negative impacts of climate change.  
Instead, the PBL report recommends that the full 
spectrum of regional impacts is summarized in the 
upcoming Fifth Assessment Report, including the 
uncertainties.   
Despite these criticisms, it is important to note 
that the overall conclusion of the PBL report was 
that the Fourth Assessment Report was sound.  In 
addition, the PBL report made clear that it did not 
question the IPCC conclusions that global 
warming since the middle of the 20th century is 
very likely to have been due to human influence 
on the global climate, as this conclusion was 
found by a previous review to be robust, even 
when taking into account peer-reviewed scientific 
literature expressing doubts on this relation (PBL, 
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